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Moreau), j.dittmer@ucl.ac.uk (J. Dittmer).Diplomacy and recognition play central roles in the conventional conferral of state legitimacy and func-
tioning of the inter-state system. In broadening the diplomatic frame by stepping outside the conventional
state-system, this paper brings a poststructuralist and performative toolkit to mimetic diplomatic
practices. Adapting Bhabha’s notion of mimicry to diplomatic discourse, it demonstrates how non-state
diplomacies draw on, mimic and intervene in the realm of formal political action in ways which both
promote ‘ofﬁcial’ state diplomacy as an ideal and dilute its distinction from other, ‘unofﬁcial’ diplomacies.
In thereby examining the enactment of international diplomacy in unexpected spaces, this paper brings
together three empirical studies: a Government-in-Exile, a religious community and micropatrias
(self-declared parodic nations). In each of these cases, attention focuses on: discourses of recognition; sov-
ereignty and legitimacy; the diplomatic relationships fostered and institutions of diplomacy constructed;
and the strategic position of such diplomacy vis-à-vis the conventional state-system. Unpacking the rela-
tionship between legitimacy, recognition and diplomacy and exploring the tension between state-centric
and non-state diplomatic practices, this paper foregrounds the points of connection between the ofﬁcial
and the unofﬁcial. As a result, this paper expands the analytical gaze of diplomacy studies while incorpo-
rating lessons from the margins into our understandings of legitimacy, recognition, statecraft and
sovereignty.
 2012 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY license.1. Introduction
Geopolitical events as diverse as the uprisings of the ‘Arab
Spring’, the secession of South Sudan, the formation of the European
External Action Service and the WikiLeaks affair foreground the
intellectual urgency of issues around international diplomacy. Seen
alongside President Obama’s rhetorical promotion of international
respect and soft power, the norms, discourses andpractices of diplo-
macy have come under increased academic scrutiny (Parmer and
Cox, 2010; Sharp, 2009). Taking the European state system as the
traditional point of departure (Neumann, in press), International
Relations (IR) scholarship on diplomacy has traditionally assumed
the state to be a ‘natural’ and bounded container for political activity
(Taylor, 1994), and has focused on the efﬁcacy of diplomacy in
the purportedly anarchic world of international politics. Thus,
while diplomacy is ostensibly for resolving differences among pre-
existing states, it is simultaneously a discourse of recognition and
authority (re)performed by sovereign states to exclude non-sover-
eign others. In the popular framing of diplomacy as interactionsBY license.
, moreau.terri@yahoo.com (T.among states ‘high politics’ becomes the exclusive realm of polities
that mutually recognize each other as peers.
However, diplomacy can also be considered as any ‘‘channel of
contact’’ (Gilboa, 2002, p. 83), and thus be broadened out to
encompass practices beyond the stereotypical accoutrements of
state formality. These include ‘disaster diplomacy’ whereby foreign
policy relations are enacted through the provision of aid to an erst-
while rival during a time of crisis (Kurizaki, 2007; Regan and Aydin,
2006), the diplomatic role of culture and sport (especially in the
contexts of the Cold War and ‘war on terror’ see Hixson, 1997;
Kennedy, 2003; Peppard and Riordan, 1993), and the broader
engagement of ‘public diplomacy’, the communication of policy
perspectives directly to foreign populations in order to establish
a dialog to inform and inﬂuence these audiences (Melissen, 2005;
Pinkerton and Dodds, 2009). While certainly a far cry from the
world of protocol and ambassadors, these diplomacies maintain
the emphasis on enacting foreign policy within the closed society
of states.
This paper broadens the diplomatic frame further by stepping
outside that society to examine instances of ‘unofﬁcial’ diplomacy
that nevertheless still draw on the discourses and performances
of ‘ofﬁcial’ diplomats, still deal ‘‘with the political process on a
global level’’ (Ammon, 2001, p. 8), and still reify the ‘‘idea of inter-
national society’’ (Sofer, 2007, p. 36). These ‘unofﬁcial’ diplomacies
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mal political action in revealing ways. Adapting Bhabha’s notion
of mimicry to diplomatic discourse, this paper untangles these
threads and foregrounds the points of connection and convergence
between the ofﬁcial and the unofﬁcial in ways which both promote
‘ofﬁcial’ state diplomacy as the ‘gold standard’ to aspire to, and
unsettle it by reducing the gap between the ‘real’ and the ‘mimic’.
As such, the paper broadens the analytical gaze of diplomacy stud-
ies while incorporating lessons from the margins into our under-
standings of conventional topics such as recognition, legitimacy
and sovereignty.
We begin by reviewing diplomacy, with a focus on different
theoretical and disciplinary approaches to the topic and recent
scholarship on soft power, public diplomacy and non-state actors’
paradiplomacy. We then demonstrate the utility of Bhabha’s
theorization of mimicry in approaching the diplomacy of non-state
actors. To address the research lacuna of formal diplomacy on the
margins of the state system, we outline three case studies, each
drawn from our broader research projects.1 The ﬁrst is the diplo-
matic practices of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile (McConnell)
through which this unrecognized polity seeks to construct legiti-
macy and enact a degree of ‘stateness’, deﬁned as the social relations
and mundane practices that give rise to state effects (Painter, 2006).
The second is the International Christian Embassy – Jerusalem (Ditt-
mer), an institutionalized representative of Christian Zionism which
strives to intervene in ‘high politics’ despite not aspiring to sover-
eignty itself. The ﬁnal case study is the diplomacy of micropatrias
(Moreau) which, in the absence of traditional recognition, recognize
each other and form international institutions to promote shared
aims, thus producing stand-alone, parallel international communi-
ties. Juxtaposing these case studies enables us to consider the tacti-
cal use of diplomatic discourse by non-state groups to subvert the
international system and contest its exclusions. Yet, at the same
time, these non-state actors leave the international system itself
intact. In conclusion we argue that such ‘unofﬁcial’ diplomacies
are, somewhat paradoxically, important to the hegemony of ‘formal’
diplomacy and we foreground the role of mimicry in producing
diplomacy from the margins as a serious topic. Finally, some possible
directions for future research are offered.2. Diplomacy of and beyond the state
In its narrowest sense, diplomatic theory is an ‘‘applied body of
knowledge pertaining to the right conduct of professional diplo-
mats in their relations with one another’’ (Sharp, 2009, p. 7), with
Satow’s (1922) and Berridge’s (2002) guides to diplomatic practice
epitomizing this approach. Broadly speaking, the theorization of
diplomacy has largely occurred within IR and, reﬂecting disciplin-
ary debates, IR scholars have conventionally studied diplomacy in
the context of the realist/idealist divide. Realists theorize diplo-
macy as another form of force to be brought to bear in the national
interest, albeit a more palatable one (Kissinger, 1995; Langer,
1951), while idealists see diplomacy as a tool capable of resolving
conﬂicts and producing a less violent world order (Diamond and
McDonald, 1996; McRae and Hubbart, 2001). Meanwhile, discus-
sions around diplomacy within international law focus on the legal
structures that facilitate these state-to-state exchanges theorized
by IR scholars (Bassiouni, 1980; McClanahan, 1989). The most
comprehensive account of diplomacy from the perspective of polit-
ical geography, by van der Wusten and Mamadouh (2010, p. 1),
itself argues that ‘‘the geography of diplomacy is not a familiar sign1 These diplomacies are formal in that they are rooted in the rituals and language o
traditional state-based diplomacy, rather than being simply about communication in
a generic sense (as with public diplomacy).funder which scholars congregate like diplomatic history.’’ While
nuanced and inﬂuential work within political geography has
deconstructed the discourses of foreign policy (Dodds, 1993; Ó
Tuathail and Agnew, 1992), attended to the role of diplomacy in
imperial geopolitics (Kearns, 2009) and examined the agency of
geopolitical elites (Kuus, 2008; Müller, 2008), there is something
of a dearth of geographical research that attends to the practices
and legitimizing role of diplomacy per se. Exceptions include quan-
titative studies of diplomatic connections (Neumayer, 2008; van
der Wusten and van Korstanje, 1991), systematic reviews of the
location of diplomacy (Henrikson, 2005) and case studies of partic-
ular diplomatic contexts and negotiations (e.g. Campbell, 1999;
Chaturvedi, 1998; Dahlman and Ó Tuathail, 2006; Newman, 2002).
While such work maintains a state-centered focus on formal
diplomacy, two trends have diverged from this literature in recent
years and are central to the theoretical framing of this paper. These
are (1) an increasing focus on different modes of diplomacy draw-
ing on ideas of soft power and the theorization of public diplomacy
and (2) a broadening of the type of actor engaged in diplomatic
practices to include non-state polities. Nye (2006, p. 26) differenti-
ates the sovereign performances of power: ‘‘Hard power, the ability
to coerce, grows out of a country’s military and economic might.
Soft power arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture,
political ideals, and policies.’’ Perceived as a key lever of soft power,
and seeing a revival in the post-9/11 era when links were made
between international perceptions of the United States and the
country’s national security (Ross, 2002), public diplomacy is
conceptualized as based on ‘‘a complex relationship between three
major components: the government, the media, and public
opinion’’ (Gilboa, 2008, p. 62. See also Melissen, 2005; Mor, 2006).
Given the consequent foregrounding of the diplomatic role of cul-
ture (Finn, 2003; Kennedy, 2003) and the idea of ‘nation branding’
(Olins, 2005), scholarship on public diplomacy has been highly
multidisciplinary, including contributions from IR, cultural studies,
sociology, psychology and public relations.
Even as work on public diplomacy remains generally state-
centric, its broad remit means that it offers the potential to open
up space for non-sovereign polities to get a foot in the door
(Mattern, 2005). As such, attention has increasingly focused on
non-state actors such as the intervention of NGOs in formal diplo-
macy to promote conﬂict resolution and foster intergovernmental
decision-making on environmental issues (Betsill and Corell,
2008), the role of corporate diplomacy that requires state-corporate
interaction with regards to management, trade and international
relations (Strange, 1992) and the institutionalization of indigenous
communities’ engagement with diplomacy (Beier, 2010; Epp,
2001). While instructive on issues of agency, international lobbying
and the blurring of diplomatic boundaries, the cases under consid-
eration here are distinct from NGOs, corporations and indigenous
communities in their mimicking of aspects of stateness. Perhaps a
closer ﬁt is work on paradiplomacy, understood as the foreign pol-
icy capacity of sub-national, regional or local governments (Aldecoa
and Keating, 1999; Duchacek et al., 1988). With empirical attention
focused on the international relations of regional governments in
Europe and North America (e.g. Basque Country, Scotland, Quebec),
this form of diplomacy is interpreted as ‘‘more functionally speciﬁc
and targeted’’ than conventional state diplomacy, and often
opportunistic and experimental (Keating, 1999, p. 11).
Emerging from this literature has been a valuable focus on the
inter- and intra-diplomacy of non-central governments (Shain,
1989) and a foregrounding of how this diplomacy renders ‘‘the
understanding of actorness at once important but increasingly
difﬁcult’’ (Hocking, 1999, p. 36) and fundamentally transgresses
the national/international, domestic/foreign binaries which have
been so central to conventional IR theorisations (Walker, 1993).
However, while such observations offer an important insight into
2 This research is based on in-depth interviews with TGiE ofﬁcials, the Represen-
tive of the Dalai Lama at the Bureau of Tibet, New Delhi and Ofﬁce of Tibet, London,
nd a number of Tibetan MPs in 2006–2008. Participant observation was also
ndertaken at the Fourth World Parliamentarians’ Convention in Edinburgh, 2005,
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eral, scholarship on paradiplomacy has been descriptive rather
than analytical, focusing on detailing strategies employed and lim-
itations faced. As such, these scholars rarely question the legitimat-
ing work that diplomacy accomplishes or attend to the
performative aspects of diplomatic practices. In order to engage
with what is, we argue, a productive line of investigation, it is fruit-
ful to turn to critical approaches to diplomacy.
Impelled by what he saw as a theoretical lacuna in the history of
diplomacy as simply an applied practice, Der Derian (1987) was
one of the ﬁrst to use social theory to trace the genealogy of Wes-
tern diplomacy and explore its ‘essence’ as a means of mediating
estrangement. Building on this post-classical analysis, Neumann
(2002, 2007) and Constantinou (1996, 2006) draw on poststructur-
alist perspectives to explore the role of discourse and practice in
diplomacy, with the latter asserting that diplomacy should be
understood as ‘‘an ensemble of practices, power struggles, and
truth contestations that develop into a dominant discourse for
dealing with the other’’ (1996, p. 110). In addition to deconstruct-
ing the practice of diplomacy, these scholars also turn critical
attention to diplomats themselves and foreground the inter-
personal relations, personality traits and experiential dimensions
of diplomacy (Neumann, 2005; Constantinou, 2006). Speaking to
shifts in state theory which emphasize that states (and their
assumed sovereignties) are themselves effects produced through
discourse and performance (Weber, 1998), these poststructuralist
approaches to diplomacy therefore call into question the processes
of mutual recognition that diplomacy enables and take diplomacy
to be productive of geopolitical space. This paper marries these
post-structuralist approaches to diplomacy with possibilities for
formal diplomatic practices at the margins of and even beyond
the inter-state system. With such theoretical approaches opening
up conceptual space in which it is possible to consider legitimacy
as historically contingent and socially constructed, our aim is to
begin to unpack the relationship between legitimacy, recognition
and diplomacy and to examine the tension between formal diplo-
matic practices and non-state actors. Such scholarship also speaks
to trends in political geography towards a focus on practices
(Springer, 2011), embodiment (Mountz, 2004) and the role of geo-
political actors (Kuus, 2008), but from an empirical viewpoint
which has, to date, often been overlooked.
We do this by adapting Bhabha’s notion of mimicry to diplo-
matic discourse. Bhabha deﬁnes mimicry as ‘‘the desire for a re-
formed, recognizable Other, as a subject of a difference that is
almost the same, but not quite,’’ (1984, p. 126, emphasis in original).
In his original formulation, Bhabha was addressing the identity
practices of empire. Part of the ‘‘white man’s burden’’ was the
expectation of reforming the colonial Other as a subject of moder-
nity. Nevertheless, imperial power relationswere based on a radical
difference between colonizer and colonized; the (perceived) suc-
cessful remaking of the colonial subject undercut the difference
that was required to maintain the status quo. Therefore, colonial
mimicry (that is, the strategic adoption of metropolitan manners
and practices) necessitated the emergence of new discourses of
unalienable difference (often racial). This may seem distant from
the concerns of diplomacy, but when one considers the European
origins of the state system and the practices that form its diplo-
macy, it is clear that participation in that diplomacy by postcolonial
states and non-state polities can be read as a form of mimicry. As
we demonstrate below, the diplomacy of state-like non-state actors
can be understood as mimicry of a colonial (and colonizing) dis-
course of legitimacy; the mimicry can approach its referent asymp-
totically but never match it, never gaining full recognition as equal:
It is as if the very emergence of the ‘‘colonial’’ is dependent for
its representation upon some strategic limitation or prohibitionwithin the authoritative discourse itself. The success of colonial
appropriation depends on a proliferation of inappropriate
objects that ensure its strategic failure, so that mimicry is at
once resemblance and menace. (Bhabha, 1984, p. 127)
In other words, mimicry is political in that it reinforces colonial
(here, diplomatic) legitimacy by elevating it; ‘ofﬁcial’, Eurocentric
practices of diplomacy become the norm to which others conform
(Neumann, in press). However, paradoxically, mimicry undercuts
that elevation by closing down the distinction between the author-
ity and the mimic upon which political legitimacy rests. This dis-
tinction always remains inversely proportional to the mockery
that locates the mimic as subordinate.
The following three case studies illustrate the variety of mimic-
ries available to non-state actors, from loose mimicry that adopts
some of diplomacy’s trappings, to claims of diplomatic equivalence
that deny any excess whatsoever. These unofﬁcial diplomacies can
be understood to bolster diplomatic discourse and its state system
as well as subvert or undermine it through sheer ‘representational
force’ (Mattern, 2005). They are, simultaneously, both ‘resemblance
and menace’ in that they both elevate ‘ofﬁcial’ state diplomacy as
ideal and dilute its distinction from other, ‘unofﬁcial’ diplomacies.
3. Tibetan diplomacy in exile
In April 1960 the Dalai Lama re-established the Tibetan Govern-
ment in the North Indian hill-station of Dharamsala with the twin
task of restoring freedom in Tibet and rehabilitating Tibetan refu-
gees. Despite remaining internationally unrecognized, having lim-
ited juridical powers and lacking jurisdiction over territory, the
exiled Tibetan community has, over the decades, institutionalized
the Tibetan Government-in-Exile (TGiE) which now enacts a range
of state-like functions (McConnell, 2009). As with other aspirant
governments seeking to position themselves within the interna-
tional sphere, cultivating relations with other governments and
intergovernmental organizations forms a core part of TGiE’s remit
and activities. In examining such attempts to engage with the
international community in the absence of legal recognition,
Reisman (1991) argues Governments-in-Exile appropriate symbols
of legitimacy in order to maintain their governmental claims, with
the ‘‘language of stateness’’ (Hansen and Stepputat, 2001, p. 9)
being particularly important as they negotiate their place on the
international stage. In the case of TGiE, this polity attempts to mi-
mic (external) legitimacy and sovereignty through discourses of
good governance and a range of diplomatic practices. Given the ex-
ile government’s lack of legal status, it is logical to expect that this
polity engages only with informal aspects of public diplomacy,
which are in turn enhanced by the strong ‘national brand’ (Ham,
2001) of the Dalai Lama, Tibetan Buddhism and romanticized
images of Shangri-la. However, as outlined here, TGiE also seeks
to create and maintain an international persona through mimicry
of more traditional and ‘ofﬁcial’ diplomatic practices. These include
the Dalai Lama’s formal meetings with state leaders, TGiE’s engage-
ment with legislators from various states and the administration of
a series of pseudo-embassies.2
The role of external affairs and diplomatic relations was consid-
ered to be of utmost importance to the TGiE in the early years of
exile as, without the coercive power and military capabilities
inherent to ‘hard power’, alongside a Buddhist commitment to
non-violence and principles of compassion and cooperation, thisnd during visits of Tibetan parliamentarians to Westminster in 2007 and 2009.ta
a
u
a
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power’ (Nye, 2006; Ofﬁce of Dalai Lama, 1969). In keeping with
the state-like bureaucratized structure of TGiE, exile international
affairs are handled by the ‘Department for Information and Inter-
national Relations’ (DIIR). Occupying a prominent position within
the TGiE complex in Dharamsala, this department has its origins
in the chisee khang (Foreign Relations Ofﬁce) which was re-estab-
lished in exile in 1959. With growing demand from the interna-
tional community for information on Tibet in the 1970s and
1980s, the chisee khang was amalgamated with the ‘Information
and Publicity Ofﬁce’ which had been established in 1971. The role
of the latter reads like a checklist of conventional public diplomacy
activities. These include liaising with international media and Tibet
Support Groups across the world, maintaining the exile govern-
ment’s website (www.tibet.net) and providing information on
the human rights, political and environmental conditions in Tibet
through a series of publications. This is coordinated by a ‘UN and
EU desk’ which provides information on human rights in Tibet to
these organizations and a ‘Chinese desk’ which provides outreach
to Chinese citizens by translating and disseminating information
on a dedicated website.
In addition to these public diplomacy roles, DIIR also engages in
more traditional and formal modes of diplomacy. At ‘home’, the
Department serves as a protocol ofﬁce of TGiE, extending ofﬁcial
reception to diplomats, government ofﬁcials, journalists and NGO
ofﬁcials visiting Dharamsala, and arranging visits to Tibetan cul-
tural, religious and educational institutions and meetings with
TGiE ofﬁcials. Moreover, through the DIIR, the exile government
maintains unofﬁcial foreign missions, known as ‘Ofﬁces of Tibet’,
in eleven cities across all continents: New Delhi, Kathmandu, Gen-
eva, New York, Tokyo, London, Brussels, Moscow, Canberra, Preto-
ria and Taipei. Although their diplomatic activities are restricted
due to TGiE’s lack of legal recognition, they nonetheless maintain
direct contacts with governments and parliamentarians and spear-
head the administration’s UN initiatives. The Ofﬁces’ embassy-like
functions also include acting as a channel of news from Tibet,
facilitating the exchange of information between organizations
concerned with the Tibet issue and coordinating the Dalai Lama’s
ofﬁcial visits. In addition to these general functions, and in light
of limited funds, each ofﬁce was established with a clear goal in
mind. First to be established, the Bureau in New Delhi is key to
liaising with the ministries of TGiE’s host state India, interacting
with other embassies in the city and processing identity docu-
ments for Tibetans leaving and re-entering India.3 As part of an
early effort to internationalize the Tibetan issue, the New York Ofﬁce
was originally established to lobby the UN and now also serves as
the focal point for the increasing number of Tibetans settled in North
America. Meanwhile, the Kathmandu Ofﬁce looks after the needs of
recent refugees from Tibet, while the Ofﬁces in London, Tokyo and
Canberra reﬂect both the growing Tibetan diaspora and TGiE’s desire
to engage with states which are politically powerful on the interna-
tional stage.
Each Ofﬁce of Tibet is led by a ‘Representative of the Dalai
Lama’, a title which facilitates tacit recognition of these individuals
as ambassadorial representatives of TGiE from parliamentarians
and foreign ministries.4 With regards to discrepancies between their
ofﬁcial status and unofﬁcial working relationships, the Representa-
tive at the Bureau of Tibet in Delhi explained:3 With its somewhat different history and functioning, the Bureau of His Holiness
the Dalai Lama in New Delhi is the only ‘foreign mission’ not classiﬁed as an ‘Ofﬁce o
Tibet’.
4 Although the Dalai Lama announced his retirement from political life in March
2011, has transferred authority to the Tibetan Parliament in Exile and the Kalon Tripa
(Prime Minister), and no longer appoints the heads of the Ofﬁces of Tibet, these
individuals retain the title ‘Representative of the Dalai Lama’ (interviews with TGiE
ofﬁcials, 4–5 October 2011).
5 For details on the World Parliamentarians’ Conventions on Tibet see: http:/
tpprc.org/about-wpct.html and http://www.tpprc.org/5th-wpct-18-19-november-f. . . it is diplomacy and international pressure which prevents
these governments granting full recognition to us as a govern-
ment, but at the embassy level they do deal with the Bureau as
like an embassy and certainly as the representative of the Dalai
Lama and his administration. So in reality the Bureau . . . we are
granted de facto recognition and certainly recognized as having
[the] moral authority of the Tibetan people (26 October 2007).
Therefore, while the ﬁnancial, legal and political limitations of
these Ofﬁces of Tibet are considerable, their existence and mimicry
of formal state-like modes of diplomacy is nevertheless signiﬁcant.
So, for example, although the Ofﬁce of Tibet in London is merely a
set of rooms above an ‘oriental medicine centre’, it ﬂies the Tibetan
ﬂag, welcomes visitors and the ‘ambassador’ attends as many gov-
ernmental functions as he is able. This includes giving brieﬁngs to
cross-party parliamentary groups, liaising with Indian embassies
and consulates regarding exile Tibetan identity documents and
meeting with Foreign Ministry staff of states across Northern Eur-
ope. Likewise, though DIIR cannot engage in overtly political activ-
ities given TGiE’s lack of recognition and fragile relationship with
the Indian state, the Department still manages to fulﬁll a number
of conventional ‘foreign ministry’ functions and is the key
gatekeeper for TGiE external communications and relations.
Alongside the institutions of DIIR and Ofﬁces of Tibet, TGiE em-
ploys a number of other strategies in order to establish, manage
and negotiate its diplomatic relations (interviews with DIIR ofﬁ-
cials, 2006–2008). With regards to intra-diplomatic links with
other unrecognized polities, its founding membership of the
Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO) is key.
A unique organization of over 60 indigenous, minority and occu-
pied peoples not adequately represented at major international
forums, UNPO facilitates participation of these polities in the
international community through engagement with UN bodies,
lobbying the European Parliament and training its members in
diplomacy. As such, this functions as a key forum for the profes-
sionalization of potential diplomats, such as exile Tibetans, and
offers an insight into how diplomatic practices are taught and
learned beyond traditional spaces of diplomacy (www.unpo.org).
In fostering relations with recognized states, TGiE has organized
a number of parliamentary exchanges in recent years, including,
for example, delegations of Tibetan MPs to Westminster to brief
parliamentarians and the Foreign Ofﬁce, and visits of British MPs
to Dharamsala, occasions which, as a DIIR ofﬁcial put it, ‘‘make
these foreign statesmen [sic] realize what we’ve achieved and. . . in
this way they take us as serious and as a government’’ (3 Novem-
ber 2007). Alongside these exchanges, TGiE has organized a series
of World Parliamentarians’ Conventions on Tibet. The ﬁrst of these
conventions was held in New Delhi in 1994 with 69 parliamentar-
ians from 25 countries, and subsequent meetings have been held in
1995 (Vilnius), 1997 (Washington, DC), 2005 (Edinburgh) and most
recently 2009 (Rome), where 133 delegates attended from twenty-
nine parliaments.5 With the objective of fostering international
debates on the question of Tibet and garnering support for the Dalai
Lama’s ‘MiddleWay Approach’ to resolve the Tibet issue, these meet-
ings provide a forum for interaction and future coordination among
parliamentarians sympathetic to the Tibetan cause. In terms of out-
comes, these conventions have initiated the formation of cross-party
groups for Tibet in legislative bodies around the world and deﬁned a
plan of action on what parliamentarians can do to seek a resolution
to the future of this territory.
Despite strong opposition from the Chinese consulate in
Edinburgh and pressure from Chinese embassies on those states2009-rome.html./
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elaborate affair. The hall in a leading Edinburgh hotel was decked
out with the national ﬂags of the MPs present – with the snow-lion
emblazoned Tibetan ﬂag centre stage – and all parliamentarians
were conspicuously treated as equals, including those of the unrec-
ognized Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile. Such mutual recognition was
manifest in gift exchanges and terms of address used, and the
Kalon Tripa (Tibetan Prime Minister) gave the keynote address. As
Shain notes, ‘‘international forums have become the mecca for
many exile groups that face difﬁculties in generating governmental
support and thus search for alternative routes to the global
audience’’ (1989, p. 128) and the overt performance of statehood
during this convention conﬁrms the importance of ritualized
protocol and the performative aspects of diplomacy and statecraft
(Constantinou, 1998).
In summary, turning to why the exile government pursues
these costly and time-consuming diplomatic practices, the answer
lies in the fact that they arguably constitute a form of recognition,
albeit not one acknowledged by realist scholars or, surprisingly, a
number of social constructionists. While productively exposing
recognition as a historically contingent and non-linear process
(Strang, 1996), critical perspectives often still perceive mutual
recognition between constituted sovereigns to be the dominant
mechanism underpinning state sovereignty (Biersteker and Weber,
1996; Wendt, 1999). In light of this, the case of TGiE offers an
important counterexample. Concurring with Shearer’s (1994, p.
129) conundrum that ‘‘non-recognition does not necessarily mean
non-intercourse with non-recognizing states’’ this example also
takes this further, as the legitimacy derived by TGiE from the
multiple forms of often inferred recognition discussed above posits
a broader notion of recognition and (external) sovereignty than
that offered by such theorists. It challenges their state-centric bias
by extending these constructionist arguments to recognition by
and of non-state entities.
These mechanisms through which TGiE performs diplomacy
can thus be conceived as further conﬁrmation that foreign policy
is no longer the exclusive provenance of recognized states, and that
procedural de facto sovereignty can and should be distinguished
from substantive de jure sovereignty (Murphy, 1996). Moreover,
while sharing a number of characteristics of paradiplomacy
(Aldecoa and Keating, 1999; Lecours, 2002), this case extends this
model in important ways. For, unlike regional governments, the
ability to engage in diplomatic practices is not devolved to TGiE
by a central state but is a strategy it enacts of its own volition.
As such, these outward-facing performances, practices and dis-
courses are an attempt by TGiE to lend credibility and legitimacy
to what is often deemed clandestine and threatening, and implies
some measure of international personality. Thus, in seeking to en-
hance its own legitimacy and political effectiveness, TGiE has made
a concerted effort to mimic key statehood symbols which can be
seen to be an iteration of statehood credentials in order to become
‘real’. However, engagement in diplomatic performance need not
necessarily be linked to the performance of statehood per se. Diplo-
macy can be mimicked by groups who are not seeking sovereignty
but still seek to intervene in the inter-state system. Here ‘realness’
comes not necessarily in the form of stateness, but through the
institutionalization of collective identity. Such is the situation in
the next case study.an intriguing twist of fate, this building is rumored to be Edward Said’s family
(Masalha, 2007), although this may be anti-ICEJ propaganda.
his research is based on a discourse analysis of the ICEJ’s website, white papers,
ther publically available documents and an interview with Len Grates, the
tor of Development for ICEJ-UK (January 2010).
lthough the deﬁnition of this territory is contested within the ICEJ, a common
denominator is support for the 1980 annexation of Jerusalem.4. The International Christian Embassy – Jerusalem
In 1980 the state of Israel declared both East and West Jerusa-
lem, which had been united under Israeli control during the
1967 Six Day War, to be its capital, ‘‘complete and undivided’’
(Basic Law, 1980, n.p.). This unilateral decision, which was contraryto the claims by Palestinians and surrounding Arab states that East
Jerusalem should remain under Arab or international control,
resulted in the movement of national embassies from Jerusalem
to Tel Aviv by countries anxious to avoid being seen to support this
decision and thus appear partisan during peace negotiations. This
diplomatic maneuver relied on the understanding of sovereignty
as mutual recognition among sovereigns and played on Israel’s
perceived vulnerability as a state with less-than-universal recogni-
tion. The lack of international acceptance of the newly declared
capital incorporated a tacit reminder that Israel’s international
legitimacy was itself contingent on the backing of a few major
supporters. While seemingly a purely symbolic protest (although
having material implications for day-to-day relationships between
the Israeli government and ambassadors), the movement of the
embassies nevertheless indicated that while Israel was de facto
sovereign within East Jerusalem, it was not able to be so de jure
in that territory without the assent of the dominant powers that
shape international legal discourse.
While this kind of ‘high politics’ is traditionally described by
realist scholars as the realm of state-sanctioned authorities, includ-
ing understandings of diplomacy as the exclusive sphere of ambas-
sadors, foreign ministries and the diplomatic cables, the revocation
of diplomatic support for Israel’s decision was generally opposed
by a non-state theological movement: Christian Zionism. Empha-
sizing the continued role of the Jews as God’s chosen people and
their divinely sanctioned right to the land identiﬁed in the Bible
as Canaan, Christian Zionism seeks ‘‘to give voice to that which
Jesus Himself has already said; namely, that the modern-day resto-
ration of the State of Israel is not a political accident, or merely the
result of a secular, political, Zionist movement, but rather the
fulﬁllment of God’s own Word’’ (ICEJ, n.d., p. 1). Christian Zionists
founded their own embassy in Jerusalem in September 1980 as an
act of solidarity with the Israeli people and government. The Inter-
national Christian Embassy – Jerusalem (ICEJ) continues to exist
today as an organization devoted to representing the interests of
Christian Zionists to Israel and Israelis, with a staff of ﬁfty at the
embassy in Jerusalem and support from ICEJ branches in almost
eighty countries. It is notable that ICEJ occupies the former site
of the Chilean Embassy, one of the last to leave Jerusalem in
1980 and which sparked the formation of the ICEJ.6 Given its ori-
gins as a statement of diplomatic support for Israel and expression
of recognition for Israeli sovereignty over East Jerusalem it is ﬁtting
that ICEJ styles itself as a diplomatic entity. However, in performing
this identity ICEJ produces a space in which realist-inspired relations
between diplomacy and sovereignty are exposed as ﬁctive and gen-
erative of unequal power relations. Thus, ICEJ functions as the repre-
sentation of a non-sovereign political constituency within the state
system. The ICEJ serves a double role – (1) to afﬁrm and recognize
the state of Israel and (2) to produce the political constituency of
Christian Zionists as an institutionalized geopolitical and diplomatic
actor. These will each be addressed in turn.7
First, and as indicated earlier, ICEJ was created to mimic state
practices through the recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of
Israel, thus recognizing Israel itself as a sovereign actor with a
particular territorialization.8 As ICEJ executive director Malcolm
Hedding writes,
The ICEJ afﬁrms that it is proud to be located in Jerusalem, to
speak for the interests of multitudes of Christians in this regard6 In
home
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ofﬁcially accredited with diplomatic status, the International
Christian Embassy – Jerusalem does represent the views of
millions of Christians worldwide who believe their nations
should place their embassies here (2006, p. 1).
Despite not having ofﬁcial diplomatic sanction, ICEJ maintains a
network of relationships with Israeli political factions and leaders.
On one level this is very much about the personal diplomacy of
Malcolm Hedding, the public ‘ambassador’ of ICEJ. As Len Grates,
Director of Development for ICEJ-UK put it, ‘‘the current executive
director. . .he has built the organization on strong relationships both
in the Christian world but also in the Israeli political world. So he’s
highly respected in Israel, he has regular meetings with [Israeli PM]
Netanyahu’’ (15 January 2010). This claim to access at the highest
levels of Israeli government is argued to result from the wide-
spread and talented base of the Christian Zionist movement. Grates
continues, ‘‘What the Embassy is [. . .] trying to do in the political
world is to bring in its understanding, and its huge expertise,
because within the 40 million constituents there are some serious
academics’’ [and]. . .‘‘because it’s becoming quite large and
respected [the ICEJ] also has a lot of credibility,’’ (15 January 2010).
This mimicry of diplomatic engagement with the Israeli govern-
ment is, however, incomplete and contestedwithin Israeli domestic
politics because of skepticism over ICEJ’s evangelical intentions.
Therefore the mutuality of this recognition must be called into
doubt. It is an uneven relationship at best. While Malcolm Hedding
is invited to events because of his relationships with Netanyahu and
President Peres, ICEJ has recently experienced a reduction in staff
(from 70 to 50) as a result of a restriction in visas. Len Grates attri-
butes this to the compromises of coalition government; the Shas
party, which presently controls the Interior Ministry, is described
as ‘‘very anti-Christian’’ but ‘‘fortunately the Embassy has a lot of
voices, up to Netanyahu who say ‘Hey look, you can’t do this. We’re
stabbing ourselves in the back if we do that,’’’ (15 January 2010).
The second way in which ICEJ maintains its network of relation-
ships within Israel is through everyday practices. Because the ICEJ
mandate is to provide support to Israel, it undertakes a variety of
activities that attempt to build trust between Christian Zionists
and Israeli Jews. This can be understood as mimicry of public diplo-
macy, in which geopolitical messages are conveyed directly to for-
eign populations. These include a partnership between ICEJ and
Yad Vashem (the Israeli Holocaust Museum) in which ICEJ has
set up a Christian desk at the museum to promote reconciliation
between Christians and Jews, as well as an effort to raise money
for the Israeli humanitarian effort in Haiti. Further, according to
Len Grates ICEJ has an ‘adopt a Holocaust survivor’ program
. . .to just love them, in their latter days, to show them some love
and care. It may just be helping them with practical things.
Some of the young people work, they come to a care home
and decorate it. Or they go dig some in the gardens. . .. So the
purpose of the Embassy is to show practical, loving compassion
where the opportunity arises. (15 January 2010)
A further, latent form of diplomacy occurs during periods of
conﬂict and war, in which volunteers from ICEJ assist in hospitals
and provide other civil defense functions (short of engaging in
combat). Thus, both in terms of classic, face-to-face diplomacy
and of everyday, public diplomacy, ICEJ seeks to establish and nur-
ture relationships between the Christian Zionist community
around the world and the State of Israel through the mimicry of
diplomatic practices.
In addition to its outward-facing recognition and support of
Israel, ICEJ also serves as a way of constituting the far-ﬂung
Christian Zionist community as a geopolitical actor. Delineating
two roles of the Embassy, Len Grates ﬁrst argued that:The Jews are a race and their own group of people in their own
right. There’s only Jews and they only have one state in Israel,
whereas the nations in the Bible are referred to as one group
of people known as Gentiles. . . In some ways the Embassy rep-
resents the Gentiles as opposed to nations. (15 January 2010)
This expansive view of the ICEJ constituency includes a wide ar-
ray of people who likely would not consider ICEJ to speak for them.
However, elsewhere, ICEJ literature indicates the role the Embassy
plays within the Christian community by arguing for a Christian
Zionism that is rooted in covenant theology (e.g., Brimmer et al.,
2006; Parsons, n.d.). Further, the ICEJ website (http://www.ice-
j.org) mimics the form of a traditional embassy website. It streams
news headlines about Israel that reﬂect a Christian Zionist perspec-
tive, announces Israel-based ICEJ programs and activities and
provides access to white papers which set out the perspective of
ICEJ on issues both geopolitical and theological. Thus, ICEJ can be
understood to be producing its own constituency through its
engagement with Israel; it provides a theology, an identity and
an institution with which to afﬁliate.
It is with this performative dimension in mind that Len Grates’s
other description of ICEJ’s constituency can be best understood:
I guess [ICEJ is] looking at the large Christian community world-
wide. . . that is spread right across the globe; as I said there are
86 national ofﬁces, so it’s the opposite to a standard embassy. A
country sends out embassies to many countries. Whereas the
Christian Embassy – many countries are supporting one
embassy in Israel. (15 January 2010)
Indeed, just as ICEJ is networked with Israeli politics and soci-
ety, it is constituted by a network of national organizations that
are operationally separate from ICEJ. For example, ICEJ-UK is a lim-
ited liability company whose domestic activities include confront-
ing anti-Semitism and helping Jews in the UK, promoting Christian
Zionism vis-à-vis replacement theology (in which God’s promises
to the Jews are transferred to the Christian Church following the
resurrection of Jesus) and supporting Aliyah (an organization that
helps fund Jews who wish to move to Israel).
Of course the most important aspect of the national organiza-
tion is its fund-raising for ICEJ. As Len Grates put it:
We help to fund the Embassy too – it’s a big building. They don’t
get anything fromwithin Israel so it’s funded from international
donations so that’s part of the work as well, support. . .we send
it out there and they spend it as they need to use it. (15 January
2010)
Beyond the ﬁnancial dimension, the executive board of ICEJ is
composed primarily of national directors who are elected periodi-
cally to reﬂect geographic diversity and also the demographics
(and donations) of Christian Zionism. The United States is almost
always represented on the board, and Sweden and Norway often
feature as a result of their donation levels. As Len Grates explained,
The Embassy wouldn’t exist without the international support,
so there’s a mutual appreciation of that and on important mat-
ters all the national directors would be consulted, because I
think there is this sensitivity that we are representing Chris-
tians in Brazil, the UK, in America, Australia, China. . .and so
there are different sensitivities that are brought into the mix.
(15 January 2010)
In summary, the ICEJ is similar to the TGiE in that it mimics
diplomatic practices in order to gain the legitimacy through which
to intervene in the world of ‘formal’ inter-state politics. However,
the ICEJ differs from the TGiE in twomajorways. First, while it seeks
to intervene in the realm of territorial politics through its advocacy
for Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, it seeks no territory, or
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‘paradiplomacy’, and must be considered as something related to
but distinct from those practices. However, it should be noted that
non-sovereign religious diplomacy has a long history beyond this
example, with one of the earliest types of diplomatic representative
in Europe being the Apocrisarius, an ecclesiastical envoy (Neumann
in press). Second, while the TGiE has past links to stateness and
Tibetan nationalism, the ICEJ is an attempt to create something
anew – a geopolitical actor to not just represent, but constitute,
Christian Zionism on a global scale. In other words, the performance
of diplomacy is itself productive of something in need of represen-
tation; the ﬂows of money and organizational network of the ICEJ
provide an infrastructure through which Christian Zionism exists,
acts and is identiﬁable. The ﬁnal case study similarly plays with
questions of self-constitution through the mimicry of diplomacy,
but returns to the sovereign state as a model, albeit one to be
engaged with through irony.9 Heavily digital in representation, the majority of this research took place on-line,
ia archives, active embassies, and personal emails. However, more traditional forms
f contact such as posted mail and diplomatic international visits also occurred.5. The diplomacy of micropatrias
Similar to the TGiE in their quest for recognized sovereignty,
and to the ICEJ in their attempts to constitute legitimate geopolit-
ical actors and networks, micropatrias (such as the Democratic
Republic of Bobalania or the Sovereign Kingdom of Kemetia) are
self-declared nations that mimic and in many ways parody estab-
lished sovereign nation-states. Micropatrias are spaces where
forms of humor and seriousness intertwine and entangle to allow
for playful and critical approaches to sovereignty through national
representations and diplomatic performances. These representa-
tions and performances vary along a continuum of functions, in-
tents and styles in terms of the explicit and implicit expressions
of humor, seriousness, playfulness and criticality. The micropatrial
examples discussed here are meant to capture different points
along this continuum. Crucially, the importance of such mimetic
performances is not in offering ‘‘a model for the future but as a
reﬂection on the present’’ (Steinberg et al., 2011, p. 14), with reﬂec-
tion being an ‘articulation of ideas’ that comment upon and are
critical of the ‘norms’ (Steinberg et al., 2011, p. 3).
Generally, micropatrias claim sovereignty based on the 1933
Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States. The
Montevideo Convention stresses declaration as the basis for sover-
eignty and statehood, needless of constitution from any outside
international actors or other states. Spatially, micropatrias are en-
claved by ‘host’ states, most notably the United Kingdom (UK), the
United States and Australia. The micropatrias discussed here are
enclaves within the UK as ‘host’. Appropriating power representa-
tionally, micropatrial enclaves engage in ‘formal’ diplomacy
through their mimetic performances to reinforce their declared
status and to challenge ‘conventional’ recognition of sovereignty.
Paradoxically, micropatrias take issue with, and yet mimetically
rely on and reproduce, hegemonic norms of sovereignty and diplo-
macy. This reliance on and reproduction of international norms by
micropatrias highlights the stark binary between sanctioned, state-
centric diplomatic actors and mimetic practices of non-state actors
at the margins. The ‘representational force’ (Mattern, 2005) of mic-
ropatrial diplomatic approaches targets two distinct audiences and
performs in two overarching ways. First, to reinforce their declared
status, enclaved micropatrias typically send word to the host via a
letter. Even if such practices are stereotyped or even misrepre-
sented, this mimicking of formal approaches to opening channels
of diplomacy ‘tests the waters’ of response (or non-response) of
enclaving sovereign nation-states. Autonomous representations
of micropatria and micropatrial perspectives on host responses
are discussed below as ‘inter-diplomacy’. Second, framed here as
‘intra-diplomacy’, micropatrial communications with each otherlend agency to their diplomatic performances.9 Inter-diplomacy
with the host ‘community’ and intra-diplomacy within the micropa-
trial ‘community’ are each discussed in turn below.
The mimetic performance of inter-diplomacy is the representa-
tional force generated by declaring a micropatrial ‘sovereign’
through interaction with an established sovereign nation-state
and/or international community. Inter-diplomacy by micropatrias
within the UK usually takes the form of a letter sent by a micropa-
trial representative to a local council, the Prime Minister, the Lord
Chancellor, the Queen of England, or even the United Nations (UN).
The performance of inter-diplomacy by micropatrias produces
their declared status and represented autonomy, yet the need to
communicate with others to (re)produce this autonomy illustrates
the desire for some form of recognition.
In return, the UK as host and the UN as international community
typically either do not respond (refusing to recognize), respond in
an aggressive manner (implying criminality), or respond politely
via either an acknowledged receipt of letter (automated protocol)
or referring the micropatria to another department (refusing
responsibility). These responses could easily be considered failed
diplomacy between recognized (ofﬁcial) and unrecognized (unofﬁ-
cial) diplomatic actors illustrating the existing binary between
state-centric and marginal performances and the exclusion of the
latter, yet micropatrias envisage such responses as victories. Each
type of (non)response is considered in turn through speciﬁc exam-
ples concerning micropatrial experiences and how these (non)re-
sponses are viewed as victories of recognition.
First, the host response of refusal to recognize by not respond-
ing to communication from the micropatrial enclave is regarded as
an acceptance of the declared autonomy of micropatrias, such as
when King Danny I of the Kingdom of Lovely delivered his declara-
tion of independence to the UK government. After waiting some
time for a response – and as a humorous performance – he stated,
‘‘So far I haven’t heard any news so I guess that everything is okay’’
(Wallace, 2005, n.p.). Second, by implying criminality as a response
and reacting in an aggressive manner, the host creates opportunity
for opposition through legal debates over whether micropatrial cit-
izens are bound by UK laws. As a more serious example along the
continuum, this is illustrated by the Principality of Sealand’s court
case which resulted from shots ﬁred at the British Navy. In the end,
the Principality of Sealand was declared outside of UK jurisdiction
(PS, 1968). Third, when the host issues a letter as response,
whether via the automated protocol of acknowledging receipt of
correspondence or refusal of responsibility by way of naming an-
other department as the correct contact, the micropatria perceives
this as recognition of their declaration. The Crown Dependency of
Forvik repeatedly experiences the polite acknowledgment of let-
ters while being passed to other governmental departments. Since
no authority has directly confronted the Crown Dependency of For-
vik’s declared status or prosecuted the leader for non-compliance
of laws or non-payment of taxes, the latter views itself as not under
UK rules and regulations. As the leader of the Crown Dependency
of Forvik stated in regards to response versus non-response, ‘‘it’s
a win-win situation’’ (Stuart Hill, personal interview, September
2010). While these (non)responses can be dismissed as non-recog-
nition, therefore lending no legitimacy to the declared sovereignty
of the micropatria, they nevertheless make transparent the esoteric
quality of recognized conventional sovereignty.
Intra-diplomacy, by contrast, is diplomacy among micropatrial
sovereigns andwithinmicropatrial communities. Examples include
the establishment of embassies, internet forums, the signing of
treaties, personal contact (visits, emails and letters, gifts), micropa-v
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pics, and cooperation across borders such as joint ventures in space
programs. For purposes of brevity, two mimetic examples will be
considered here: ﬁrst, diplomacy of embassies and consulates as
transnational performances; and second, diplomacy of interna-
tional organizations as multilateral performances.
As a function of diplomacy, embassies and consulates reify the
diplomatic community and, accordingly, recognized sovereignty.
The 138 pages of the London Diplomatic List (2010) published by
the British Foreign and Commonwealth Ofﬁce aid in supporting this
claim by cataloging the hundreds of members of the London
Diplomatic Corps and their sovereign associations. Diplomatic out-
lets, such as these, are also important to the representational force
of micropatrias. Such diplomatic representations further play with
notions of sovereignty and diplomacy. With regards to sovereign
host (non)responses, micropatrial mimesis comments upon current
diplomatic and statecraft conventions and their exclusionary prac-
tices. Yet, micropatrial engagement allows for a platform that chal-
lenges and questions taken-for-granted geopolitical constructions
as non-state actors that at the same timemimic, and therefore reify,
the systematic practices of sovereignty and diplomacy. As an exam-
ple, the Principality of Paulovia, which has 49 consulates through-
out the world, claims its diplomacy aims to ‘‘Promote and support
international and local charities, relief organizations, environmen-
tal, health and education organizations and programs, emergency
aid appeals and campaigns amoung [sic] citizens and non-citizens
alike in their region. . . .This is the key role of the Diplomatic Corps’’
(PP, 2010, n.p.).Micropatrial consulates and embassies such as these
are thus symbolic and represent a layering and complicating of
space. The layering of alternative networks of formal diplomacy
onto the hegemony of state-centric ones in turn complicates politi-
cal geographies and the ‘natural’ and static (or discretely bounded)
qualities of such state-centric channels of contact. Such symbolism
is an intra-diplomatic function of mutual recognition of efforts in
pursuit of shared micropatrial values. Ambassadors who represent
these consulates and embassies are further agreeing to promote
the micropatria and its principles across an international parallel
network. These mimetic practices call into question the exclusive
recognition and legitimization of sovereignty and diplomacy.
In addition, and as a result of practices of intra-diplomacy, mic-
ropatrias collectively produce digital international communities in
which member nations share concerns, consider possibilities and
practice statehood. The function of such organizations is recogni-
tion of sovereign claims via diplomatic representation and digital
communication. The League of Secessionist States, for instance,
‘‘exists to promote intermicronational communication and part-
nership, and serves to act as a supramicronational, impartial Body
where such a need for one may exist’’ (LoSS, 2010, n.p., emphasis
original). Another example is the Organization of Active Microna-
tions, which works to ‘‘maintain micronational peace and security’’
as well as implement ‘‘recognition of sovereignty and legitimacy of
government of every member micronation’’ (OAM, 2010, n.p.).
These non-state representations challenge the right to diplomatic
agency under the banner of declared sovereignty. Such parallel
entities paradoxically make transparent the exclusionary practices
of conventional state-centric diplomacy while reproducing the
very structure of hegemonically constructed sovereignty and
diplomacy. While as noted earlier, micropatrias cite the Montevi-
deo Convention which deﬁnes external recognition as superﬂuous,
micropatrias ironically seek recognition through inter- and intra-
diplomatic means.
Micropatrial national representations and diplomatic mimetic
performances highlight hegemonic constructions of sovereignty
and diplomacy and, as a result, challenge the exclusionary nature
of recognized sovereigns and international organizations. By creat-
ing enclaves within hosts, micropatrial diplomacy works dynami-cally to emphasize the pragmatic and complex spatial layers that
exist and are often hidden behind the hegemony of (non)recogni-
tion. Through their autonomous declarations and inter-diplomacy,
micropatrias denaturalize membership in international communi-
ties and the recognition of sovereignty. Meanwhile, micropatrial
citizens, tactically employing autonomous representations and
expressions of agency, transform into unofﬁcial geopolitical actors.
Via these diplomatic performances, micropatrias play with the nor-
mative spatialities of sovereignty. The performance of sovereignty
and the numerous tactics of diplomatic communication by micro-
patrias make transparent the exclusionary practices embedded in
the ‘conventional’ international system.Micropatrias open up space
for subversive responses and expressions to sovereign impositions
and norms. As anomalous political geographies, micropatrias create
spaces in which dialog on the taken-for-granted can begin to ques-
tion the practices and performances of recognized sovereign states.6. Non-state actors and the mimicry of diplomacy
The three case studies described above demonstrate how diplo-
matic representations are not only strategic hegemonic tools em-
ployed by constituted powers to exclude, but can also be tactically
performed by entities that challenge the composition and status
of the interstate system. In thereby ‘‘question[ing] the classic notion
of international relations as a domain reserved for states’’ (Aldecoa,
1999, p. 89), such cases fundamentally transgress the inside/outside
binary of international politics and shine a spotlight on the role of
contingency in the untidy discursive production of international
recognition, sovereignty and legitimacy. Drawing on Bhabha’swork,
these spaces of diplomatic mimicry can be imagined as remainders,
left over and left behind as the ‘legitimate’ international system is
continually constituted. It is their excess that provides the constitu-
tive outside to the diplomatic realm. Even as their existence threat-
ens that system, the system relies on them for representational
force to reify systematic norms. In turn, ‘‘this suggests too the pos-
sibility of other analytical frameworks [. . .] beyond the presence or
absence of undifferentiated sovereign power, towards a contextual
understanding of different regimes, apparatus, expressions and rep-
resentations of sovereignty’’ (Sidaway, 2003, p. 174).
However, while these cases show the ambivalent systemic re-
sults of adopting diplomatic discourses and practices, they also
illustrate the representational power that can be tapped into
through those discourses and practices. For TGiE, diplomacy is used
to maintain a veneer of state legitimacy in the absence of territorial
jurisdiction or international recognition. For ICEJ, diplomacy is em-
ployed to intervene in classic geopolitical questions of state recog-
nition and territory and also to institutionalize a minority concern
(Christian Zionism) within global Christianity. For micropatrias,
diplomacy provides a conduit of representational power that can
be appropriated during acts of self-constitution and ironic critique.
However, these case studies cannot be wholly collapsed into a
singular ‘alternative diplomacy’, as they each speak to different ori-
entations vis-à-vis the state and international politics. First, with
regard to the state, TGiE is marked by its enactment of a signiﬁcant
degree of stateness. In closely mimicking state practices, TGiE is
striving to play the ‘state game’, and diplomacy is a key part of that
effort. As such, this case encourages us to think of statehood not as a
restrictive legal concept but as relative with different entities meet-
ing the criteria for international statehood to greater or lesser de-
gree (Clapham, 1998). Micropatrias occupy the middle ground on
the spectrum of stateness, adopting the language of states but doing
so in a playful fashion that engages in ironic mimicry. Through their
subversive parodying of sovereign diplomatic practices, micropatri-
al playfulness aims to challenge taken-for-granted constructions of
sovereignty. Meanwhile, at the other end of the spectrum the ICEJ
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tions to sovereignty. The ICEJ’s loose mimicry embraces its own ex-
cess, even as it hopes to intervene in inter-state politics. More
generally, we argue that these cases demonstrate how aspects of
statecraft are emulated and practiced by actors outside of the recog-
nized world of sovereign states. As the discussion above illustrates,
it is often not sufﬁcient for non-state actors to ‘only’ engage in
public diplomacy. In order to attempt to construct an international
personality and a degree of legitimacy within the international
community, such polities also strive to imitate formal and ofﬁcial
diplomatic practices and institutions because it is the establish-
ment of a pseudo embassy, organization of parliamentary
exchanges and formation of multilateral organizations which are
perceived as key leverages of power. As such, noting the different
outcomes sought by these cases, the TGiE could be argued to be
rehearsing statecraft, while ICEJ strategically employs state-like
practices and micropatrias are playfully mocking statecraft.
Second, with regard to the degree of engagement with interna-
tional politics, the ordering of the spectrum is slightly different.
Again, TGiE occupies the ﬁrst position as, with its raison d’être of
seeking genuine autonomy for the territory of Tibet, it seeks to
directly engage with and put its case to recognized governments
and major intergovernmental organizations. In the middle ground
on this spectrum is ICEJ, which exists to engage in the realm of
international politics but does so with a focus on Israel. Finally,
micropatrias imaginatively occupy the far-end of the spectrum,
as their playful engagement with international politics is often a
matter of intra-diplomacy including personal treaties, pacts or
disputes among micropatria sovereigns. Even at this end of the
spectrum, however, humor and irony must be understood as some-
thing not antonymic to serious representation, but a representa-
tional force in and of itself, and an extension of the serious.
Embedded within this playfulness is serious critique: of states,
their bureaucracies and the ritual pomp of their diplomacy.
The variety of these unofﬁcial diplomacies indicates that more
empirical investigation into non-state diplomacy is necessary, in
particular to examine the unequal power relationships that current
emphases in the literature on diplomacy produce. An obvious ﬁrst
line of enquiry would be to further engage with how such cases of
unofﬁcial diplomacy ‘‘move us beyond proﬁtless debates as to who
are and who are not signiﬁcant actors in world politics’’ (Hocking,
1999, p. 21). By blurring the boundaries of ‘traditional’ deﬁnitions
of state and non-state players, the examples highlighted here pose
important questions as to the ‘‘deﬁnition of international actorness
and the relationships between differing categories of actor’’ (Hock-
ing, 1999, p. 18; Kuus, 2008). Moreover, by collapsing conventional
notions of the ‘ofﬁcial and proper’ conduits of statecraft, these
cases disrupt diplomatic performances of the state. However,
rather than calling for a dismantling of the state, such appropria-
tion of these same forms of representation reconceptualize issues
of agency and actorness and highlight the pragmatic and heteroge-
neous constructions of folded international space. This multiplicity
of ‘international’ spaces takes the form of seemingly incommensu-
rable worlds: the ‘ofﬁcial’ international realm of nation-states; the
non-territorial polities that claim some form of legitimacy in that
realm; and the micropatrias that compose a parallel international
state system simultaneous to the more well-known UN system.
Nevertheless, these seemingly incommensurable spaces are folded
in on, brushing up alongside and drawing representational power
from one another. Together they form an assemblage of ‘diplo-
macy’ that must be considered in its totality.
Second, while an emphasis can and should be developed on the
practices of ‘alternative’ diplomats, it is important to also examine
the communicative qualities of diplomacy (Gilboa, 2002) and the
variety of ways in which traditional geopolitical actors receive
messages from them. This is hinted at especially in the case studyof micropatrias, which generate much of their representational
power from the ways in which host states respond (or do not) to
communicative acts. Providing a heretofore unexamined connec-
tion between the diplomacy literature and that of audience studies
(Dittmer and Dodds, 2008), unofﬁcial diplomacies offer up new
possibilities for studying the sending, and receiving, of diplomatic
messages. Such attention to practices of listening and interpreta-
tion might entail ethnography of mundane embassy/‘embassy’
translation and ofﬁce work, or it could take the form of archival
research into past high-level communications.
Finally, recent research themes within political geography both
speak to, and could be enriched by, investigations of diplomatic
practice as discussed above. These include work on foreign policy
analysis (Dodds, 1993; Mercille, 2008), research on the practices
and trajectories of geopolitical elites (Kuus, 2008; Müller, 2008)
and emerging work on formal politics within the geopolitical mar-
gins (Agnew, 2010; McConnell, 2009). Indeed, as we have demon-
strated through our empirical snapshots, a focus on unofﬁcial
diplomacies is revealing in important ways. Not only does this fo-
cus begin to respond to calls to re-engage with practical geopolitics
(Dalby, 2010; Kelly, 2006), but, following the argument that the
abnormal has something to tell us about the normal, attending to
articulations of formal diplomacy in ‘unusual’ places exposes the
contingent practices that underlie political power in so-called
‘conventional’ states.Acknowledgments
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